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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
-----------------------------------------
SALLY M. MARTINEZ and the STATE OF 
UTAH, by and through Utah State 
Department of Social Services, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
-v-
EUGENIO MAX ROMERO, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
No. 14573 
Appeal from an Order of Dismissal of the 
Third Judicial District Court in a~d for 
Salt Lake County, the Honorable Bryant·a. 
Croft, presiding. ~ 
-------------------------------~-·-~-~~ .... 
SAMUEL KING 
409 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Respondent 
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Salt Lake 
Attorneys ~for. 
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Ill THE SUPREME COURI' Cf' TIIB STATE OF UTAH 
---------~-~-----~----------~-----
Si\LLY M. :•IA.ZfiliEZ and the STATE OF 
UTAH, by ilTU through UTJ\J-1 STATE 
DEPAR'IMBn' OF SOCIAL SERVICES, 
Plain':i£fs and Appellants, 
- v -
EUGENIO rlAX PD'·~, 
De':en::1ant arrl Resi:ondent. 
BRITE' OF APPELLANTS 
No. 14573 
-"'=llants, State cf S':a..'1 and Sally M. Martinez, appeal fran 
an orce::- ::-,_-__ ::.:-ffi against appella.r,ts in the District Court of the Third 
Judicial '.::'::_:o~ict, Salt rake County, State of Utah, granting resi:ondent's 
i·lotion to ::;:;_~iss and thereby barring any action to establish paternity 
of co-plaiz:tif f's minor child. 
DISPOSITION r:J THE IDl'JER COURI' 
Following the filing and serving of the canplaint to initiate 
paternity proceedings, the court diS!'1issed the action based on defend-
unt' s clai.rr. that the statute of liinitations had run. The =urt held 
that a paternity action was controlled by Utah OX!e Annotated 78-12-22. 
RELIEF SOUGP.T ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek reversal of the lower =urt' s order and 
r:im:orandUl'l decision holding that t..h.e establishment of paternity and the 
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liability to supr:ort does not exist wlless the action is carmence:l withir. 
eight years and request that this case be ranande:l and the canplaint 
reinstatai so as to pennit the processes of the court action to take 
place. 
STATEMENI' OF FACTS 
The co-plainti£f, Sally M. Martinez, gave birth to a child 
out of wailock on January 25, 1968. Co-plaintiff and defendant, Eugenio 
Max Ronero, were not married at the time of birth or conception of the 
child and defendant has refused to acknowle:lge said child as his own. 
The State of Utah and Sally M. Martinez filed a canplaint 
against the defendant on the 27th day of January, 1976, allegi.rq tbat 
the defendant was the father of co-plainti£f' s illegitimate child and, 
as such, was to be declare:l the legal and natural father of the child 
and was liable for t.1-ie reasonable expenses of pregnancy and confinenent 
of co-plainti£f and the education and necessary supr:ort of said child 
by virtue of Utah Code Annotatoo 78-45a-l (1953, as amended 1965). The 
State seeks judgment against the defendant in the amount of Four Thou-
sand One Hundred Dollars ( $4, 100. 00) for the aforE!llentioned expenses 
which were provided for co-plainti£f and her minor child fran February, 
1972, through January, 1976, by the Social Services Department, and 
that the deferrlant also be ordered to pay the amoW1t of Seventy-five 
Dollars ( $7 5. 00) per month as reasonable support artl maintenance for 
the child. 
This case came before the court on defen::lant' s motion to dis-
miss. After taking the matter under advisffilent, the court rule:l that Utah 
Code Ann. 78-12-22 controlled all actions for the establishnent of 
paternity. 
-2-
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
A FATHER O\!ES THE SAME DUTY OF SUPPORT TO 
BOTH LEGI7IMATE AND ILLEGITH!ATE CHILDREN. 
At common law a bastard was said to be "filius nullius," 
the child of nobody, or "filius populi," the child of the people. 
In essence, the illegitimate child had no father known to the 
laH. "Illegitimacy was considered disgraceful, and a bastard 
was disqc.a.lified from certain offices." 10 Am. Jur. 2d 848-849. 
Most sta-:es have since mitigated more or less the rigors of 
the -:::::-:- _ - :_'-'-w and conferreC. upon illegitimate children rights 
wh~=~ = _- -~~previously denied . 
. 'I::iijo v. i·:esselius, 73 i·Jash. 2d 716, 440 P.2d 
the court held that the words "child or children" 
in a wro~;=ul death statute meant that the death action was 
for the tenefit of decedent's wife, husband, "child or child-
ren" which included illegitiJnate as well as legitimate child-
ren of deceased parents: 
"The reason for this trend is clear. Society is 
becoming progressively more aware that children deserve proper 
care, comfort and protection even if they are illegitimate. 
The burden of illegitimacy in purely social relationships 
should be enough, without society adding unnecessarily to the 
burden with legal implications having to do with the care, 
health, and \•1elfare of children." 
-3-
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Utah law is clearly in line with the modern 
trend which recognizes that all children need and deserve 
proper care. Under Utah Code Annotated 78-45(a) (1) of the 
"Uniform Act on Paternity," the father is liable" to 
the same extent as the father of a child born in wedlock 
. for the education". and "necessary support .. 
of the child." In further clarifying the exact meaning 
of the above cited statute, one must turn to the companion 
statutes to understand the intent of the law. Utah Code 
Annotated 78-45-3 states: "Every man shall support his wife 
and his child." (Emphasis added.) "Child," as defined under 
Section 78-45-2(4), "means a son or daughter under the 
age of twenty-one years and a son or daughter of whatever 
age who is incapacitated from earning a living and without 
sufficient means." (Emphasis added.) 
Even before the enactment of the above quoted stat-
utes, this court has long recognized the absolute nature 
of the father's support duty: a father has "a positive 
duty to support his minor child." Jenkins v. Jenkins, 153 
P.2d 262, 107 U. 239 (1944). In Rockwood v. Rockwood, 236 
P. 457, 65 U. 261 (1925), this court stated that "the duty 
of the father to support his children, if he is able to do 
so, is imposed in this state by positive statute. It 
would be his duty in any event if there were no statute upon 
-4-
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the subject." In a more recent case, Rees v. Archibald, 
6 Utah 2d 264, 311 P.2d 788 (1957), this court said: 
"This court has invariably emphasized 
the father's obligation to support his 
children based upon the elementary princi-
ple that the law imposes upon those who 
bring children into the world the duty to 
care for and support them during their 
minority and dependency." (Emphasis added.) 
Given the continuing nature of a father's duty of 
support and the legislative grant of equal rights to educa-
tio!'. a:--,c :--.c:cessary support to all children (78-45a-l, supra) 
it ~~ ~~~~~:ul that the legislature intended that the rights 
:itioate child to such support should forever be 
bar::_ ! because an ac~ion has not been brought within 
ei;:--.;:: as held by the lm:er court. The right of the 
illegit~~~~~ child to be s~p~orted by its father as opposed 
to that c: ~he legitimate child would hardly be the same 
if abrosa~le by a statute of limitations which runs during 
the chil~'s ~inority and bars an action to establish paternity 
and enforce the support duty. 
POINT II 
TO BAR A PATERNITY ACTION BY A CHILD, PARENT, 
OR PUBLIC AGENCY DURING THE CHILD'S MINORITY 
IS A DENI.l\L OF EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS 
JI.ND OF THE RIGETS A;; ILLEGITIMATE CHILD HAS 
FOR SUPPORT. 
Children born out of wedlock have the sai-ne rights 
to support, education, and necessities as those born through 
legitimate channels. The laws of the State of Utah recognize 
-5-
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all children whether legitimate or not as equals. To buy 
the position of the lower court does away with this recogni-
tion of "equality" and once again places on a child "after 
eight years" the stigma of the early common law of being 
"filius nullius" if an action has not been brought in that 
time period. To take such a position removes from society 
the progress made in the recognition of rights and becomes 
overt-rank discrimination against a child who had no say 
in its conception, birth, or early life. Much too often, a 
young child does not know the legal, moral, societal impli-
cations until several years beyond what the court has held 
is the tLme for the action to commence. 
The United States Suprene Court entertained ques-
tions on the rights of illegitirl1ate children as compared to 
those of legitimate children in Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 
535, 93 S. Ct. 872 (1973}, and drew the following conclusion 
" • • • Once a state posits a 
judicially enforceable right on behalf 
of children to needed support from their 
natural fathers, there is no constitutionally 
sufficient justification for denying such 
essential right to a child simply because 
/the7 natural father has not married /Ehe7 
mother, and such denial is a denial of equal 
protection." 
What are these "judicially enforceable" rights? 
First of all, the duty of support was discussed in point one 
of this brief. Rees v. Archibald, supra, specifically spell 
-6-
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out this duty as does Utah Code Annotated 78-45a-l and 78-45-1, 
et seq. Further, the Colorado Supreme Court said as stated 
in Garvin v. Garvin, 108 Colo. 415, 118 P.2d 768 (1941): 
"The primary liability of the father to his minor child al-
ways exists during minority." (Emphasis added.) 
Need the "judicially enforceable" rights under 
Utah law be any clearer to fall under the mandate of Gomez? 
No. There must be equality in the application of the right 
fa'::-. 
The lower court in the case at bar feels other-
-~~ obvious inequality is seen in this case. If the 
. "stion had been born of a marriage with a "known" 
~ child would be able to call upon that father 
for :-.2~_: .~:::3. support through its entire minority. However, 
under ~:-e :~gic of the lower court, if the parent, guardian, 
public c;c:2:-:cy, or child does not bring an action within eight 
years, the child is forever barred from claiming any familial 
relatior.ship to one he could call father. 
Vihat the lower cm1rt in effect has done is say 
that an illegitimate child has an equal right to its father's 
support only where suit has been brought on its behalf 
within an eight-year period, whereas the legitimate child's 
right to support extends through its entire minority re-
gardless of any attempt to bring suit to enforce the sup-
port obligation. 
-7-
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The defendant based his motion to dismiss on the 
fact that "an essential purpose of the statute of limitation: 
is to avoid putting a defending party in an untenable po-
sition. Here, the defendant claims the benefit of the stat-
utes because it is, as a practical matter, impossible for 
him to adequately prove a defense. " Al though there may be 
problems in defense, the Supreme Court has nonetheless held 
in Gomez, supra, that once the right of support has been 
granted "there is no constitutionally sufficient justifica-
tior. for ienying such essential right. Such a de-
nial cc~s:i~utes a "denial of equal protection." 
:-.ere is no ir.dication that the legislature intende: 
that ~'-,c:::-" ::e any exception to the general rule of support. 
Further, ::-.ere problems of evidence would hardly justify dis-
crimination between children when dealing with their essen-
tial right to support. Policy aside, it is the plaintiff 
who has the burden of proof and whose task will become in-
creasingly difficult with the passage of time. Defendant's 
apprehension in regard to evidence is not sufficient rea-
son for denying children the right of support from their 
natural fathers--not to mention the interests of the state 
and its taxpayers. 
If the rights of legitimate and illegitimate 
children are to be equal, an illegitimate must at all times 
-8-
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during its minority be granted the right to prove paternity 
either by iself or through its mother or agency charged with 
its care. Otherwise, the illegitimate child's right to sup-
?Ort depends solely on the diligence of its mother or guard-
ian, whose failure to act would, at an early age, reduce 
him to the status of welfare recipient and deny him forever 
the right to enjoy the economic benefits and social rights 
belonging to its legitimate counterparts. 
That a state may not invidiously discriminate 
against illegitimate children by denying them substantial 
ber-.efits accorded children generally is firmly supported by 
case law. A state may not, for example, create a right 
of action in favor of children for the wrongful death of a 
parent and exclude illegitil!'.ate children from the benefit 
of such a right. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 88 S. Ct. 
1509 (1968). Nor may illegitimate children be excluded from 
sharing equally with other children in the recovery of work-
men's compensation benefits for the death of their parent. 
Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 92 S. Ct. 
1400 (1972). Where, as in the instant case, a continuing 
right to support has been created for all children, a com-
plete bar to action resulting from failure to prove paternity 
within eight years discriminates unfairly against illegiti-
mates. ,\s stated by the court in ~Tew Jersey Helfare Rights 
-9-
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Organization v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 622, 93 S. Ct. 1700 (1973): 
" ... imposing disabilities on 
the illegitimate child is contrary to the 
basic concept of our system that legal bur-
dens should bear some relationship to in-
dividual responsibility and wrongdoing." 
Thus, this court should not make it more difficult 
for illegitimate children to live in our society than it 
already is. Very few children know the significance of what 
this controversy centers around at the age of eight. There-
fore, not only should this court protect the rights of the 
illesiti~a~e child who had no control over its circumstances 
but s:-.c-...:..:. _: ?ermi t the person or agency broad lee-way to use 
the ~-=---'°~-e laws for the benefit of the child. Ofttimes, 
the mo~~7~ ~~ an illegi~ir.i.ate child becomes incensed at the 
fact tha~ s~e has become pregnant and despises the natural 
father for many years. Should this fact be a bar to the 
mother bringing an action when she realizes there is some 
material and psychological benefit to the child? To say so 
would deny to such children a sacred right of parentage and 
would discriminate against them because of something they had 
no control over. 
POINT III 
UTAH CODE AN!TOTATED 78-12-22 IS NO BAR 
TO BRINGING PATERNITY ACTIONS, BUT IS 
MEANT TO BE A STATUTE OF LIMITATIO:: FOR 
ENFORCEMENT OF ESTABLISHED COURT ORDERS 
OF SUPPORT. 
-10-
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The lo~er court, in its minute entry as well as 
in the final order signed, based the dismissal on the be-
lief that Utah Code Annotated 78-12-22 (as amended) controlled 
paternity actions. The pertinent language is as follows: 
"--Within eight years: 
An action upon a judgment or decree 
of any court of the United States, or of 
any state or territory within the United 
States. 
An action to enforce any liability 
due or to become due, for failure to pro-
vide support or maintenance for dependent 
children." (Emphasis added.) 
The IY.irpose of the abo·:e statute, as seen by the 
appellants, is not to co~pletely bar the bringing of a 
paternity actior. to "establish fa-:iilial relationships" but 
limits only an obliger's liability for support up to eight 
years after a sum certain has been ordered or decreed. The 
statute must be read in light of the intent of the law--to 
allow s11pport for dependents. The language "liability due 
or to beco;ne due" was added in 1975 to codify the position 
this court took in Seely v. Park, 532 P.2d 684 (Utah, 1975). 
In that case, the mother was awarded custody of a minor 
child and defendant was ordered to pay $40 per month for 
its support. The defendant failed to abide by the support 
order and a subsequent action to enforce the order was 
initiated by the woman. His arrearage was S5,800 for 
twelve years and one month. Although no action was brought 
-11-
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within eight years, this court did not hold that the chiN 
had lost all right to enforcement of that liability upon 
the amount which was due or to become due; instead, the 
court held that defendant's liability on the arrearage was 
limited to arrearages accumulated within a period of eight 
years--i.e., $3,840 (96 x $40). 
The court in Seely, Id., quoted Simmons v. Simmons, 
105 Utah 574, 144 P.2d 528 (1943), as follows: 
"When a judgment is rendered, payable 
in installments, the statute begins to run 
against the judgment from the time fixed 
:8r the payment of each installment for the 
:::.rt then payable." (Emphasis added.) 
The a::c··,, _ l:1guage demonstrates that the application of Utah 
Code ~.:.:.:.-: .-:eC'. 78-12-22 is limited to actions brought to en-
force jui~~e:-its, orders, or decrees of the court that fix 
sum certain amounts for support. Failure to bring an action 
on this liability due or to become due does not totally 
eliminate a minor's right to receive support payments from 
its father. Instead, it serves to limit the liability due 
to an eight year period. Thus, a minor would not be barred 
from bringing an action beyond the eight year period but 
would be barred from collecting the amounts due beyond the 
statutory limitation. 
Appellants are quick to point out, however, thatci 
eight year statute does not control support obligations in 
paternity matters. The Uniform Paternity Act has specific 
provision for limitation of reimbursement of necessary 
-12-
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expenses before the date paternity is established. The 
eight year statute of limitation on liability would not begin 
to run until the liability is fixed by court order. Until 
then, the shorter statute of four years preceding the ac-
tion controls. Utah Code Annotated 78-45a-3 states: 
"--The father's liabilities for past 
education and necessary support are limited 
to a period of four years next preceding 
the commencement of an action." (Emphasis 
added.) 
It would seem only logical from the above language 
that actions for support can be brought beyond the four years 
"next preceding" the corcnencer\ent of the action. Otherwise, 
the phraseology would be neaningless. The sane applies to 
Utah Code Annotated 78-1~-22. ~cat language limits only the 
amounts due on sums certain. Since the Paternity Act con-
trols the collection of necessities, limiting it to four 
years, the thrust of both statutes is to leave entirely 
alone the matter of "when" a paternity action can be brought. 
The opinion of the lower court which denie-s the 
natural mother, public agency obligated to provide its care, 
and the child itself to bring actions after an eight year 
period has gone by does not align itself with Utah law which 
provides that support goes until age 21. The Maine Supreme 
Court had a similar situation before it in Earding v. 
Skolfield, 125 Me. 438, 134 A. 567 (1926). There, a pater-
nit.y suit WilS filecl when the illegitimate child was 13 years 
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old. The court held the suit to be timely and said the 
statute of limitations was no bar to the action because such , 
an obligation is a continuing one and is not over in the 
number of years claimed under the statute of limitations. 
This court should take cognizance from the above 
case. Just like the period of liability for support--8 
years--is a shifting time period, so is the period for es-
tablishing paternity. In the State of Utah, that period goes 
to 21. Whether the moving party is the child, the woman or 
the public agency makes no difference. The entire purpose 
of either of the aforementioned parties bringing an action 
is to establish a familial relationship for the child and 
have the father of the c~ild support it as do the fathers 
of children born legitimately. By prohibiting one of the 
above named persons to establish paternity for the benefit 
of the child, it is totally inconsistent with the intent and 
meaning of the law. To permit the action secures for the 
child social security benefits of the father, industrial 
compensation, inheritance, etc. To deny this is a judicial 
decree declaring that the child "SHALL ALWAYS REMAIN A 
BASTARD." 
POTIIT IV 
ACrIONS TO ESTABLISH PATERNITY ARE NOT CONTROLLED 
BY EXISTING STA'IUI'ES OF LINITATIONS. THE A~ 
ITSELF WAS IURPOSELY SILENT THEREON, AND IT WAS, 
THEREFORE, ERROR FOR THE LOHER COURI' TO HOW TEAT 
THE ACTION \'JAS SO CONTRJLLED. 
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Despite the continuing nature of a father's support 
obligation, the defendant argued in the court below th.at "(}'Jn 
essenticil prrpose of the starute of limitati ons is to avoid putting 
a defending party in an untenable position." (R. 6) He further 
argued t.hat because no starute of limitations is found in the l::ody 
of the Uniform Paternity Act, the four year bastardy limitation was 
applicable. \~ith this, the defendant rnakes two false assumptions. 
First, he falsely assur:les that the civil action to establish pater-
nity :.3 r;a:=-"'ed by a.ny statute of li-nitations. Secondly, he falsely 
assc:-c.3 ':..°c.-:. c.:~ limitation urrler tr..e bastardy statute applies to the 
Uni:::~-
-.:-cugh deferrlar.t does r.ave a legitimate concern regarding 
his c~-"=~-'°-c. _-:2 :nere passage o: years goes to the weight of the evi-
de:-.ce :;_"xi :-.:.:o-:., as in most cases, be :::-esolved by judge ari.d jury. Ob-
viously, t:~e bnger a plaintiff's delay, the more difficult his burden 
of proof »;il2. beccne. A55 statErl by the court in Ortega v. Portales, 
134 Colo. 5J7, 307 P.2d 193 (1957): 
"The infant child cannot be deprived of 
its right to continued parental care and support 
by failure on the part of any person to act within 
a limited time following its birth. The lapse of 
time may add to the difficulties of proof concern-
ing the essential facts upon which liability may 
depend, but this does not mean that the pertinent 
facts cannot be judicially determinErl." 
In regard to defendant's first false assumption, the role 
of Utah cede Annotated 78-12-22 has already been discussed. A55 indi-
cettcd in that discussion ill1d alludErl to here, the Uniform Act on 
Paternity contains rD specific limitation period. !!ad tl:e state 
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le:rislature intena.ed to place a time limitation up::m the bringing of 
such an action, it would ha.ve speci£ically so provided. Since the 
primary µirpose of a paternity proceeding is to secure the supIXJrt 
ani aiucation of the child rather than to µmish the father, it only 
follows that the legislative intent was to ensure that the child \-.Duld 
have the right to support during its entire minority. This has long 
been recognized in Utah case law. This court said, in Roc~...cx:xi v. 
Rockw:xxi, supra: 
"The duty of the father to support his 
children •.. is irrrposed in this state by 
positive statute. It wJuld be his duty in any 
event i£ there were no statute upon the subject." 
And, in Rees v. Archibald, su=a: 
"This court has invariably emprasized the 
father's obligaticn to support his children based 
u:t:x:m the elementary principle trat the law imposes 
upon trose whJ bri.'1g childre.11 into the 'M:lrld the 
duty to care for and support than during their 
minority an:l dependency." 
In Rees, Id., this court held that a divorce decree did 
not affect the deferrlant' s responsibility for his son's support and the 
expenses of care given him. In arriving at this holding, the court 
chose that rule of law which gave 11 ••• pr:irrary consideration to 
the rights and needs of the children. 11 Thus, Utah law appears to 
follow the rule that the obligation of a father to support his child, 
le;Jit:imate or ille:ritimate, is continuing and terminates only when the 
child reaches its majority illlder a provision of the divorce decree or 
paternity order, or 21 years under Utah Code Annotated 78-45-1, et 
seq., i£ the decrees or orders are silent or i£ there are no orders. 
To apply a statute of limitations not speci£i cally provided for by 
the le:rislature to paternity actions 'tiDuld permit p.!tative fathers to 
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escape bis continuing obligation to support "his" child i£ his child 
it 11 is. 11 
10 f.m. Jur. Trials 678-679 discusses the J:astardy stabltes 
and the evolution of the fact that the Uni£orm Act on Paternity had no 
limitations. In that discussion is found a definitive statement regard-
ing the lack of a statute of l~llitations under tb.e Uni£orm Paternity 
Act: 
"Th.e original J:astardy statutes, creating a new 
cause of action, usually established a speci£ic and 
c;..:ite short period of tiTce within which the action 
:::culd be brought. In most cases the running of the 
:::'2.tute started with the birth of the child, and the 
c:=ion by the mother r.ad to be brought within a per--
,_: of fran one to th!:ee years. Some statutes stipu-
-:=.-rl that an actior: could be brought by the local 
_-:cy when the cl-J.lc: ,,as or was likely to became a 
.: ::..ic charge. If t..':ere "-aS any limitation on the 
: .. z:gir.g of such ac+-;oz:, the statute usually did rot 
::.. -:::; in to run until the c::-:ild did becane a p.iblic 
::::-..:.rge. 
Usually the stab.lte was tolled by written acknow-
le::l::;ment of paternity or by the furnishing of support. 
S-ie written acknowledgmerit must have been unequivocal 
ar.d the payment of support reasonably regular, not 
merely sporadic. 
Many if not all of the state laws continue to 
reflect such provisions. Eowever, as the views of 
society in respect to the responsibility of the 
father changed, ana after statutes were enacted rrak.-
inq it a crime for the father wilfully to fail to 
support an illegitimate child, the theor'( evolved 
that each day's failure to support constib.lted a new 
crime; thus, for all practical pirposes the statute 
,,uuld never run. 
This view is also reflected in some of the modern 
p:i.ternity statutes. The Uniforr;i Paternity Act has no 
limitations on bringing the action, but recovery can be 
had only for the ne:::essa,..ry support supplied during the 
11 four years next precedi..ng the ccmnencanent of the action. 
(Dnphasis added. ) 
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Thus, for something ro important, l::asic, and sa=e:J. as 
the establishnent of fEternity, none of the existing "general" stat-
utes do or can apply. The act itself, as indicated in Fro. Jur. Trials ____, 
Id., specifically delete:] the limitation because the drafters of that 
law recognizerl this inherent right of the illB.Jitb1ate. 
This rrore enlightenerl view which canports with the policy 
of Utah law giving " . primary consideration to the rights and 
neerls of the children" has long been applie:J. in other jurisdictions. 
In State of A.lab3rna. v. Hunter, 67 Ala. 81 (1880), a l::astardy proceerl-
ing Y.rereir. rn specific statutory limitation had been prescribed in 
the bastz:::--.2:· ~...atute itself, the court staterl: 
"We can see gocxi reasons why no statute 
limitations was prescribed to l::ar such procee:J.-
- ·c;s. They are chiC::ly interrlerl for the public 
.:..:.aennity, and to coerce the p_ltative father to 
~-~~rt and maintair. the unforb.mate child." 
In State v. Cordrey, 49 Del. 281, 114 A.2d 805 (1955), the father was 
charge:J. with failure to support his illB.Jitimate child. The court 
recognizerl non-support as a continuing crime: 
" The def errlant in this case is 
charged with non-support which the law recognizes 
as a continuing crime. In crimes of this nature, 
the stablte does not begin to run fran the occur-
rence of the initial act, which may in itself an-
l:x:rly all the elements of the =ime, but fran the 
occurrence of the most recent act. The duty to 
support the child is a contin uing duty and 
the failure to support it is a continuing offense, 
and the parent will be subject to prosecution at 
any time during the continuance of the wilful 
ne.Jlect to support the cJ1ild as provided by the 
Statute. II 
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A 1ciore recent case, State v. Christensen, 19 Ariz. 
App. 479, 508 P.2d 366 (1973), held that a one year statute of limi-
tations on actions on liability created by statute did not bar an 
action by the mother against the alleged father which was brought 
b-10 yea.rs after the child's birth to determine paternity and canpel 
support. The Arizona court followed the policy enrmciated in State 
v. i~erini, 61 Ariz. 503, 151 P.2d 983 (1944), where, after observing 
trat the bastardy article did not contain sections limiting the time 
in which the proceedings might be instituted, the court carrnented: 
"The statute is entirely free fran any 
bar of this kind, arid indeed there should not be, 
for the o!Jligation of a father to support his child, 
whether legiti..'t'ate er illegitirrate, is a continuing 
duty against which lir.titatio:-i will not rrm during 
the t.ir:te the child r.eeds such care and support. We 
c~'1!10t conceive tr.at the legislature ever intended 
to l:i.rri t the tir.e Li. \·ihich su:::h proceedings could 
be instituted and .t_::rosecuted." 
Arrl, in State v. Johnson, 216 ~!inn. 427, 13 N.W.2d 26 (1944): 
"The rule that the statute of limitations does 
not rrm until the liability has ceased to a:mtinue 
rests upon the principle that where the obligation 
is continuing in nature the breach or violation of 
duty continues so long as the obligation continues, 
and that the cause of action or penalty, as the case 
may be, must be deemed to be continually accruing 
during t.c':e entire time the obligation and the breach 
thereof continue." 
Regarding the second false assurrption, not as much need be 
said. Utah Code Ar.notated 77-60-15 is a limitation of bastardy pro-
ceedings to 4 years. It says: 
"No prosecution under this Chapter ffestardff 
shall be brought after four years fran the birth of 
such child . . . " (Emphasis and Brackets aaded. ) 
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The defendant himself in his Motion to Disniss (R. 5) states: "This 
provision is l.imited to the chapter on J::astardy." 
If the legislature had meant for the four year st2tute 
to apply to the Unifonn Paternity Act, it v:ould have so indicated. 
Furthennore, the more recent act, a Uniform Act, 'MJuld not likely be 
circumscribErl by a state J::astardy statute originally passed in 1911. 
Also, Section 78-45a-3 would be rendered meaningless if the four year 
statute were to govern. The language "conmencement of an action" with 
a liability l.imitation of four years thereon strongly implies that more 
than one action could be brought--this being so, application of the four-
year statute \o.U.lld be incongruous. 
surely, if the legislature ar.d the authors of the Unifo:an 
Pate..."'Ility Act had wanted to li.--:tit the tir..e withi.'1 which paternity could 
be establisherl either by the act itself or through use of the Bastardy 
Act, they would have so provided. A matter of such importance v.ould 
not have been deleted without a good reason-that reason being that the 
basic rights of all children and the duty of fathers to provide for 
their support should not be subject to arbitrary, unjust l.imitations 
which wuld bar the child fran exercising its rights to parental es-
tablishnent. 
POil-IT V 
IF ANY STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IS FOOND 'ID 
CON'IROL, SAID LIMITATION IS TOLLED DURTh"G THE 
CHILD'S MThDRITY AND AN N::r ION BROUGHT DURlliG 
THE MINORITY OF THE CHILD IS PROPER. 
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Srould this court find that the eight year (or any other 
length) statute of linitation controls paternity actions, such limi-
tations do not bar the bringing of the action during the child• s 
ninority. \·lhether the mother, child, or p.illlic agency charged with 
the child's support initiates and brings the action does not matter. 
The "r~~ l" ~~~ty 11· n · ter t · 11 f th .  rn es rn a o e ahJve situations is only one 
person--the child. 
Utah Code Annotated 78-12-36 (b) (1) makes it clear that 
the i.:..-:-i':.3."'.:..:..on period does not run during minority. The pertinent 
la:c-2=2 .:..s ::s follows: 
''If a person e..-.titled to bring an action .. 
?_t tr_e tirne t_r-i_e CC.'..:Se of action accrued under 
a:::-e o~ rrajor.i °'.:.'.' fr_o tici.e of su::h disabilit)'.is 
-. " =t of t.'le ti-:-.e 1 iznited for the comnencanent 
~~e 2ction .. " (~:i.a.sis addeCi.) 
µesent action fits '.:his category exactly. The child 
1,-as eight: ':=s and b..u days old when the ac ti.on was filed. The child 
res 10 years renaining for its minority. Pursuant to the ahJve stat-
ute, the l~-:titation of tiTJ'.e is tolled until majority is reached. lbw-
ever, in analysis of the foregoing, it is called to the court's atten-
tion t.'1at Ctah Code f\.r_riotated 78-45a.-2 allows the mother, p.illlic 
age..--cy, or child to bring the action in its own name, or together. In 
connection therewith, the child has a right to bring the action ard, 
thus, by the language of 78-12-36 (b) (1), the period is tolled. 
The argument undoubtedly will be raised that the suit is 
brought in the name of the state ard the mother and not that of the 
child. Therefore, since neither the state nor the mother are in their 
rninority, the statute of limitations should run. Appellants WJuld like 
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to resµ:md to this in the following manner: 
If this court agrees with the al:xJve provision, the mother 
could petition the court to be appcinted guardian-ad-litan. In. essence, 
she is doing now in her own name the same thing she v.:ould do as a 
"guardian-ad-litan," which is to pursue the interests of the child. 
Further, as indicated previously, the "real" party, no matter wrose 
name appears on the title of the action, is the "child" and not the 
mother or the State of Utah. Of course, the State would benefit 
financially because of the fact that an established paternity w:iuld 
permit collection of supp'.)rt fran the natural father when the child is 
on \\elfare. nowever, the greater benefit derived directly by the 
child greatly outv.-eighs the fev dollars collected for \\elfare reirn-
l:ursenent. 
The California S\...'PrEme Court, in Van Buskirk v. Tedd, 269 
Cal. App. 2d 680, 75 Cal. Rptr. 280 (1969), followed appellant's 
position, arove. In that case, the mother of an illegitimate child 
initiate:J. an action to determine paternity through a bastardy action. 
The court held that a bastardy action should be considered fran the 
standpoint of the child as the real party in interest, and that the 
statute of limitations in the paternity phase of such an action is 
tolled at all times from the birth of the child until his wajority, 
or until an action for paternity is brought on his behalf. The 
court also stated that the tolling of the statute during the minority 
of the child in question was not terminated by the bringing of an 
earlier paternity-support action which was voluntarily dismissed by 
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the child's representative. The court analogized the instant case 
to one in which a guardian ad liteu voluntarily discontinues an 
action brought on behalf of an infant, and where the general rule is 
that the rights of ti',e infant are not prejudicErl thereby, and that 
he may still take advantage of his disability, the action not being 
barred until the lapse of the statutory pericrl after he ba::anes of 
age. 
Further, the same court reiterated its position in 1971 
when it decided Perez v. Singh, 21 Cal. App. 3d 870, 97 Cal. Rptr. 
920 (1971). An attanpt to rave the paternity action defeated by 
lac'.'.23 1-1as there encountered by the court. The court said that in an 
act.:.c;-i to establish the paternity of an illegitirl'ate child and to ob-
tain su_'.)pcrt for that child, c:-ought by the mother on behalf of the 
chilc, the child is the real :rarty in interest, and the statute of 
limitations on the paternity aspect of the case is tolled during 
the runority of the child. The court stated that the obligation 
of a fat.her to sui:p::irt his child, whether legitimate or illegiti-
rrate, is a continuing duty against which th e statute of limitations 
does rot run during the tirre that the child needs such support. 
The ccurt felt that the result v.uuld be no different if the canplaint 
1:as inc'.eErl considered to raise equitable issues, since the action 
1·.ould be brought on the child's behalf, all benefits derived fran 
it 1-.ould belong to the child, and therefore laches could not be 
irnp.ltm to the child during its minority. 
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Appellants conterrl that the two preceding California cases 
present the law this court should follow. Since the right to support 
does belong to the child and could, under the l~ court rulin::r, 
forever be lost through no fault of his own at the age of eight years, 
the action should be considered fran the standpoint of the child as the 
real party in interest. Mlere, as in the instant case, the person is 
affected by a recognized legal disability and a continuing duty of 
supµ:irt exists, the interests of the child and society must not be 
limited by an arbitrary imposition of statutory limitation during a 
child I 5 nir.c:::-i ty • 
c::N:T...lJSICN 
--., .interests of illegi ti-nate children should be of great 
conce..-rn o:' ~-~3 court. In a d.3.y arrl age \·lhere more illegitimacy oc-
curs, tbe ~'.:.l.ral fathers who indiscriminately feel sex is a play 
toy should be required to support those children they bring into the 
\IOrld. To i;:rohibit this fran taking place, the taxpayers of this 
state will be called upon to support rrore and more children "wh:lse 
fathers can hide behirrl the technical cloak of the law. " 
It is appellants' position that the low"Err court must be 
reversed and the complaint reinstated so as to allow discovery pro-
cesses to take place to detel'.TI1ine the actual paternity of the child. 
There is nothing more basic to our society than to have that right. 
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